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The aim of this paper is to assess the volatility of Greek travel receipts by considering the 
extent to which terrorist strikes can bring about serious unexpected disturbances to the 
proceeds from tourism.The paper shows that the impact of terrorist attacks at an 
international level is not expected to bring about a considerable decline of the number of 
arrivals to Greece. This finding seems consistent with other sources in the literature that 
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Tourism has always been one of the two services pillars supporting the Greek 
current account. The receipts from travel activity added to those from international, 
mainly sea, transportation amount to more than 10% of the GDP and finance about two 
thirds of the trade deficit every year. Despite the fact that current accounts heavily relying 
on services are often a victim of their natural volatility, as they are frequently subjected to 
influences caused by often unexpected exogenous disturbances, the structure of the Greek 
current account does not leave any alternative options but a reliance on travel and 
transportation receipts to finance the trade deficit and substantial interest payments. 
The purpose of the present paper is to consider the volatility of travel receipts by 
pointing to one of the exogenous determinants that may bring about serious unexpected 
disturbances to the proceeds from tourism, namely terrorism. In fact the threat of 
terrorism seems to have revived during the recent past when secret service sources acting 
on behalf of various countries have been pointing to the fact that Muslim terrorism has 
been in the process of selecting new targets for its future attacks. In addition, the British 
authorities have recently embarked on an investigation to assess the extent to which the 
MI5 could have averted terrorist attacks since 2005 and especially the one that claimed 
52 lives that specific year. Thus, following Section II which outlines a brief description of 
the Greek current account structure, Section III takes a close look at terrorism and 
presents a review of the literature on this specific issue. The technical part in Section IV 
describes the method employed and the results obtained, followed by Section V with 
some conclusions. 
 
2. The Greek current account 
The current account deficit reached a spectacular 14.6% of the GDP in 2008 
compared with an already high 14.4% of the GDP in 2007 and an average of about 10% 
of the GDP during the period 2003-2008; it declined to 11.2% in 2009 as a result of the 
conditions prevailing in the domestic and international economic environment. Despite 
the fact that a part of this huge deficit is counterbalanced by capital transfers, the 
  5remainder, necessitating financing on the financial account, has risen to 12.8% of the 
GDP in 2008 compared to a 5.8% for 2003
1.  
The main reason underlying the current account deficit rise is the low price and cost 
competitiveness performance of the Greek economy, a situation which is aggravated in 
cases of an appreciating euro (Bank of Greece 2010). The net oil bill is an additional 
burden to the trade deficit, but this is a problem about which nothing much can be done 
given the low price elasticity of demand and the high levels of energy dependence which 
characterise the economy and becomes more pronounced in an environment of high 
growth rates. 
The services balance, has always financed a large part (about 40%) of the trade 
deficit. This has been all the more so since the decade of the 1980s when the economy 
slowly but gradually was transformed into a services economy, with all drawbacks such 
an economy may entail. In fact, the vulnerability of a current account reliant on services, 
due to the volatility of the proceeds of services, has been repeatedly exhibited in the 
Greek case. For example, the considerable decline in transport receipts after 2004 was a 
result of the fall in international freight rates which, for both the dry and the dirty bulk 
indices, recorded historical highs during the 2002-2003 period.
2 As regards tourism, 
international experience has shown how travel directives issued by state authorities can 
have a profound effect on travel proceeds, especially during a period of heightened 
terrorist activity or health epidemics. 
Thus during the last few years, and particularly after 2004, the surplus on the 
services account, which is almost exclusively composed of travel and transportation net 
receipts, finances increasingly smaller trade deficit (as a percentage of GDP). Net travel 
receipts, in particular, which represent about half of the total surplus on the services 
                                                 
1 According to the monetary authorities (Bank of Greece 2009), this disappointing performance, which 
reflects an excess of investment demand over national savings, can be attributed to excessive domestic 
demand during the last few years. This, in its turn, is reflected in the rise of the private consumption 
expenditure fostered by the boost in the consumer credit expansion. 
2 In fact the fall in the freight rates led to a decline in the rate of growth of transport receipts during the 
recent past from 39.0% in 2004 down to 4.2% in 2005 and 3.3% in 2006. 
  6account, amounted to 3.4% of GDP in 2009 and financed 26% of the trade deficit during 
a year in which the performance of travel activity was more or less disappointing
3. 
The largest share of travel services revenue comes from EU-27 member-countries 
arrivals. However, over the last two years their share has been showing a downward 
trend. Approximately two-thirds of Greek travel revenue comes from residents of euro 
area, whose participation in all travel receipts amounted to 47.6% in 2008. Concerning 
the number of visitors, the two most important countries of origin are Germany and the 
UK with their respective shares to total arrivals being 16.5% and 16.1%. These shares, 
however, have declined by about two or even three percentage points in 2008 following 
the overall decline of the EU-27 shares during the recent past. Such developments may be 
counterbalanced in the future, however, by means of penetration into new, promising 
markets such as Russia or a number of emerging countries (Karapappas and Klouri 
2010). 
 
3.   Introducing terrorism into the equation 
It has been almost impossible to agree on a universally-accepted definition of 
terrorism in the literature. A plausible version would be the one offered by Harley and 
Sandler (2007) which argues that “terrorism as a form of non-conventional conflict is 
defined as “the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to 
gain a political objective through intimidation or fear”. However, this definition leaves a 
lot to be desired as it provides ample room for subjective evaluation. Thus, one may start 
posing questions like e. g. to what extent could there ever be a level of violence or 
brutality that could be considered “normal”, or whether what one side may call “political 
objective”, the opposing side may define as a “threat to political stability” There is 
therefore a strong subjective element involved in this case that causes major difficulties to 
agreeing on a widely-accepted definition. 
                                                 
3 During 2009, in particular, net travel receipts fell by 10.6% while arrivals declined by 6.4%, the average 
length of stay remained flat, while the average expenditure per journey declined. 
  7Moreover, in cases in which the target of a terrorist strike lies or belongs to another 
country then terrorism assumes a transnational dimension. This is a possibility that 
contributes to the publicity of the terrorists’ cause especially when the international 
media focuses on it. 
The reasoning underlying a terrorist plan is very close to that of a business venture, 
comparing costs to benefits. However, the same train of thought is followed by the 
opponent, namely the state authorities. Thus a terrorist “venture” will be considered 
successful if it convinces the authorities that the costs from yielding to the terrorists’ 
demands are lower than the costs from not giving in to such demands. Thus, the cost 
imposed on society following a terrorist attack is regarded as being in direct proportion to 
the benefit derived by terrorists. One needs to focus, however, on the concept of the cost 
itself distinguishing between direct and indirect costs. The first category encompasses 
any form of direct losses following a terrorist attack (death, injury, infrastructure 
damage). Indirect costs, by contrast, refer to parallel losses in terms of higher insurance 
premiums and security cost. This paper has opted for incorporating only the direct losses 
due to the difficulties encountered when attempting to assess the indirect aspect of the 
costs of terrorism. 
Given, however, that the choice of the terrorism variable entails, in any case, some 
degree of judgment, it is useful to know to what extent the results change when 
alternative variables are used. A reasonable choice to begin with is the number of 
incidents occurring on an annual basis at a global level. A plausible alternative, tailored 
to fit the Greek case, would be the terrorist incidents taking place only in Europe, bearing 
in mind that the overwhelming share of tourists come to Greece from European countries. 
And, of course, following Fray et al. (2007), a third possible variable is that representing 
terrorist casualties in terms of both dead and wounded again in Europe which is the main 
source of visitors to Greece. Finally, attacks that took place specifically in Greece have 
been selected as a fourth alternative representing terrorism in the function. 
A different approach distinguishes between the macro and micro aspect of the cost, 
with the latter including the impact upon the cost structure of certain specific industries 
whereas the former describes the impact of a terrorist attack in terms of the cost incurred 
  8at a national or international level. In our case, however, we feel that it would be more 
appropriate to restrict our analysis to the macro level, given that touching upon any micro 
aspects would require a wide selection of data and information at a business level which 
may be far from reliable in the Greek case. 
Focusing on the macro aspect of the analysis, it is important to remember that 
national income as well as its growth rate can affect the extent to which a country can 
sustain the impact of a terrorist strike and avoid, in parallel, any adverse consequences for 
the economy. This happens because such strikes usually impose an adverse impact on 
international economic transactions and consequently production and economic activity. 
Such consequences are not expected to be equally disastrous for all economies that suffer 
terrorist attacks, but rather be influenced by their degree of development. Developed 
economies like the US, for example, can trigger more and better mechanisms through 
monetary or fiscal policy and use them to mitigate or even eliminate the consequences of 
a terrorist attack. The same applies for the money market of such countries that can easily 
recover following a terrorist strike and regain the investors’ confidence. Developing 
economies, by contrast, are much more vulnerable because their production potential is 
usually concentrated on a small number of sectors like tourism (Sönmez, 1999). This 
means that a terrorist attack on one such sector is expected to impose a severe burden on 
the economy as a whole, sometimes bringing about disproportionately extensive adverse 
consequences on the country’s GDP.
4 One might expect, therefore, that, despite the fact 
that Greece cannot exactly be considered a developing country, the cost that its tourism 
industry would suffer following a terrorist attack would be considerable given its weight 
in the country’s economy. 
A further, equally important issue considered in the literature is the possibility that 
terrorist activity generates contagion between economies. For example, an increase in 
terrorist activity in country A entails a rise in the cost of its transactions and in such a 
case there will be a trade diversion effect away from country A to another one
5. This 
                                                 
4 Following the Bali tragedy in 2002, for example, the impact on the country’s GDP was described by a 
spectacular drop (Pambudi et al. 2009). 
5 Transaction costs are not directly accrued in the value chain, but rather during the exchange of goods, 
services, and information. Ultimately, progress in globalization is a result of drastically lowered transaction 
  9means that terrorism can be regarded as equivalent to imposing a tax or a tariff distorting 
free trade flows and raising transaction costs
6. This is a fact that applies not only in the 
case of goods but also in the case of services, tourism in particular. Thus terrorist activity 
in a specific country is expected to benefit alternative travel destinations, although there 
are views that argue that alternative neighbouring destinations will share the adverse 
terrorist impact in cases in which tourists expect that the terrorist activity will expand to 
adjacent countries
7.   
The fact remains, however, that terrorism affects the choice of travel destination in 
more ways than one
8. Finally, as pointed out earlier, it seems that tourism must be 
regarded as a rather volatile revenue source in the sense that a travel directive following 
an attack at any given time period will significantly reduce travel receipts diverting the 
flow of tourists to alternative destinations. This reaction has come to render terrorist 
strikes a very popular and effective way of exercising economic sabotage
9. 
It becomes obvious, therefore, that the regression employed in this paper has been 
designed to incorporate the effects of terrorism in more ways than one: directly, via an 
appropriately selected terrorism variable; and indirectly through any possible effects of 
                                                                                                                                                   
costs, especially in telecommunications and logistics systems. This category also includes lowered 
transaction costs in insurance, controlling, or travel. In this context, even “psychological costs”—like the 
fear of travelling to a particular country—must be viewed as transaction costs. Transaction costs have 
clearly skyrocketed since the September 11 terrorist attack. 
6 Indeed, in a globalized environment there is the view that violence harms the economy in the sense that 
happens with the introduction of any intervention in the process of free trade. Therefore the government, 
which by definition is responsible (accountable) to the citizens to maximize the good "public safety" reacts 
to surge of terrorism increase, by defence spending. The case of higher defence spending to combat 
terrorism is perhaps the only case in the literature to which one may admit that there really is no question of 
'peace dividend' in the sense that the term is used in Economics of Defence ( e. g. Hartley and Sandler, 
2007 ). 
7 Araña and León, ( 2008 ). 
8 There has always been an open issue in the literature as to the direction of causality between travel 
arrivals and terrorism incidents. Enders and Sandler (1991) find that there is a unidirectional causality 
between the two variables with terrorism affecting tourism, but not the reverse. For the purposes of this 
paper, a Granger causality test proved inconclusive. 
9 For example, Enders and Sandler ( 1991 ) have calculated that the eighteen terrorist strikes that Spain 
suffered in 1988 reduced the number of arrivals by 50% per cent .It has also been calculated that Austria 
and Greece suffered arrival losses of the order of 40 and 25%, respectively, following terrorist attacks that 
took place between 1974 and 1988. 
  10international terrorism on the prices of the host country in an effort to counterbalance the 
adverse repercussions following a terrorist attack
10. 
 
4. Empirical results 
As already stated above, the paper uses three alternative terrorism measures, 
namely terrorist attacks at both European as well as at an international level while a third 
alternative is the number of casualties (both dead and wounded) suffered as a result of 
such attacks in Europe. The option of using terrorist attacks in Greece yielded very poor 
results and was, therefore, abandoned
11. However, the effects of terrorism may also be 
felt through the price of tourist services in the host country. Finally, there is always the 
possibility of an indirect influence from terrorism via its impact on the economic 
environment of the countries of origin, some of which have been suffering serious 
terrorist incidents. 
Focusing on data sources on terrorism, the paper has resorted to using the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) which provides detailed information on over 80,000 terrorist 
events around the world since 1970. The database contains a number of measures of 
international terrorism including the number of deaths, the number of casualties and, of 
course, number of incidents.
12
A typical long-run export volume function is expected to contain foreign demand 
and relative prices. The appropriate explanatory variables chosen to determine travel 
arrivals to Greece (ARR ) are the income of the countries of origin (YF) and both 
                                                 
10 To the extent that terrorist attacks bring about an adverse impact on the target country’s national income, 
then one might expect its effects to appear in the export function used through any changes in the economic 
environment of the countries of origin. However, there is no hard evidence on this in the literature so far. 
(Wang, 2009 ). 
11 The failure of the domestic terrorist incidents to determine travel arrivals has been occasionally justified 
in the sense that the majority of such strikes have occurred in the greater Athens area whereas the bulk of 
tourist activity takes place in the provinces and the islands, with Athens remaining just a transit destination. 
It must also be kept in mind that domestic terrorist incidents do not include extensive riots following 
massive demonstrations in Athens like the ones that took place during late 2008, as well as during 2010. 
The possibility of using domestic terrorist incidents was considered; however, it generated unsuccessful 
results and was therefore abandoned. 
12 For an extensive discussion on the use of the variable representing terrorism activity see e. g. Frey et al. 
(2007). 
  11domestic and competitors’ prices (CPIG) and (CPIF). Thus: The estimation period ranges 
between 1980 and 2009 using annual data in log form (Table 2 ).  
ARR= f (YF, CPIG, CPIF) 
The use of the number of arrivals as a dependent variable rather than travel receipts 
aims at avoiding collinearity problems with the price variables used as independent 
variables. The income variable is composed of the weighted average of income growth 
rates of the top nine countries of origin for arrivals in Greece, the weights representing 
the share of each of these countries in total arrivals in Greece. Given the extensive time 
period covered, the weights are allowed to vary annually to account for any possible 
structural changes occurring in the pattern of trade flows. Despite the fact that Cyprus is 
one of the top countries of tourism origin, it has been excluded from the basket used in 
order to avoid including a large number of arrivals for business purposes which would 
distort the picture. It must also be borne in mind that the length of the income series that 
extends back to 1980 has made it necessary to express the relevant figures in dollar terms 
to avoid any breaks in the series resulting from the Eurozone membership of the country. 
Domestic prices are represented by the Greek CPI. This is considered preferable to 
a variable that represents domestic price developments as a weighted average of the local 
CPI and the prices offered by the hotels in the receiving country. Prices offered by the 
hotels suffer considerable reductions in the period between the signing of the contract, 
which is towards the end of the previous year, and the last minute booking period which 
is usually June or even July of the current year. 
The competitors’ price variable is the weighted average of the consumer price 
indices of the four main competitor countries, namely Italy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey, 
expressed in dollar terms. France has been excluded from the basket given that the 
package offered by France is not comparable to that of the four main competitors or that 
offered by Greece, which exhibit a strong seasonal pattern, with an emphasis on offering 
a combination of "sun and sea", without expanding on alternative forms of tourism. The 
weights used in this case are the shares of these four competitor countries in international 
travel activity; these weights are allowed to vary each decade to account for the long data 
period. 
  12These series are initially tested for stationarity and Table 1 suggests that they all 
have a unit root. Hence, first differences of these series (the prefix D denoting first 
differences of the corresponding variables) are used in the short-run equations presented 
in Table 3.  
Table 1: ADF Test Results ( 5% t-statistic -2.95 ) 
Variable   ADF Critical Value 











         








CONSTANT 0.1617 0.6308 
YF 1.096  12.2325 
CPIG -0.3959  -2.4125 
CPIF 0.2688  1.8269 
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  14Table 3: continued 




































2 0.84 0.82  0.85 
S. E.  0. 029  0. 030  0. 028 
D. W.  2.56  2.690  2.687 
 
The equations reported in Table 3 above show that, in the short run, travel arrivals 
(ARR) depend, in addition to income (YF) and prices - both domestic (CPIG) and foreign 
(CPIF) - on a number of variables. These are international oil prices (POIL), the three 
drachma devaluations the occurred in 1983, 1985 and 1998 (DEV), Eurozone 
membership of the country (EURO) and, our variable of particular interest, international 
and European terrorist incidents (TERRINC and TERRINCE) with their alternative being 
the casualties suffered as a result of terrorist attacks in Europe (TERRCASE). Finally, an 
extra variable (EX) has been used to take into account the effect of major exogenous 
disturbances on the travel flows to Greece. Note that the short-run equations include the 
lagged residuals of the long-run corresponding version (Table 2) which have been tested 
and found to be stationary (Table 1).  
 
  15More specifically arrivals to Greece appear to be elastic with respect to income, 
during both the previous as well as the current year indicating that tourism is regarded as 
being a luxury good. This is not surprising since the majority of tourists to Greece belong 
to the middle or low income class brackets. Behaviour with regard to price changes, 
however, is inelastic. Concerning the behaviour of hotel owners and the question of 
whether they are price makers or takers in the market, it is important to point out that 
domestic market conditions are mainly dependent on the European market and more 
specifically on major European tour operators. This fact tends to cause considerable 
downward pressure on prices between their announcement and the signing of contracts. 
Tour operators seem reluctant to agree to sign contracts at the rather high prices offered 
by Greek hotels before the beginning of the season. Such tactics eventually cause Greek 
hotels to become price takers as they are forced to offer reduced prices in terms of last-
minute bookings and “all-inclusive” packages aiming at covering at least their variable 
costs
13. It goes without saying that under these circumstances and since operational costs 
are rising, the profitability of the tourist sector and the quality-to-price ratio are reduced 
to their minimum
14. The inelastic behaviour of arrivals to oil price changes is more or less 
expected and adds to the inelastic response of arrivals to price since transportation costs 
constitute a large part of the tourist package price. 
It is interesting to point out that it takes one year for most of the explanatory 
variables to influence travel arrivals in the short run. This is to be expected given that 
travel contracts with tour operators are usually signed sometime towards the end of the 
year prior to the travel period concerned. These tactics gave tour operators a major 
advantage during the period before Greece entered the euro area, given that the prices 
provided for in the contracts signed were expressed in drachma terms during a period in 
which the drachma followed a depreciating trend. This is the reasoning that accounts for 
the use of the dummy variable (DEV) capturing the effect of devaluations, as well as the 
                                                 
13 The recent (July 2010) government plans to restrict such tactics possibly aiming at attracting visitors 
belonging to higher income brackets has encountered fierce opposition from the part of the Greek tourism 
industry that was pressing instead for a VAT reduction. 
14 An excellent analysis of the costs and profitability of the travel industry is found in the “Annual Travel 
Report”, Hellenic Chamber of Hoteliers, 2009, in which attention is drawn to the conclusion of reduced 
profitability in the industry for the past few years. It is hoped, however, that the recent ministerial decision 
for a VAT reduction from 11% down to 6.5% will contribute to the cost-competitiveness improvement of 
the Greek tourism industry. 
  16application of a time trend (TEURO) to represent the influence of the period post euro 
area entry, with both variables having strong explanatory power. Finally, the volatility of 
travel arrivals is sensitive to exogenous disturbances. The variable (EX) provides for the 
response of tourism activity in Greece to the Gulf War, the Imia crisis and the recent 
recession in the domestic environment. All variables have the expected signs and they are 
significant at the 5% level. The explanatory power of the equations is substantial (82% to 
85%) with the standard error of the regression limited to about 2.5%. 
Focusing on the main question set by the paper, the equations in Table 3 suggest 
that, although terrorism, as represented by all three measures, appears significant in 
determining tourist arrivals in Greece, it appears that the variable measuring casualties 
resulting from terrorist attacks in Europe is marginally better. The fact remains, however, 
that in all cases the degree of responsiveness of the rate of arrivals to all three measures 
of terrorist activity seems to be rather weak, a view that seems consistent with other 
results in the literature (Aly and Strazicich, 2004) that argue in favour of the transitory 
impact of terrorist attacks on the flow of tourists to a specific destination 
 































































































  17Diagram 1 depicts the extent to which the arrivals rate responds to terrorist strikes 
in Europe the latter expressed in terms of casualties suffered with its values denoted on 
the right-hand axis. A first glance may tend to convince the reader that there may have 
been periods during which culmination of terrorist activity in Europe may have 
discouraged travel arrivals to Greece. One must bear in mind, however, that foreign travel 
activity to Greece is affected by a wide selection of variables, including terrorism, of 
course. For example, Diagram 1 shows that 1991 marks a considerable drop of tourist 
arrivals to Greece. That specific year coincides with increased ETA Basque terrorist 
activity in Barcelona and a number of bombings in Constantinople, by the PKK, but it is 
also the year during which the Gulf War in Iraq took place, thus discouraging a number 
of prospective visitors to Greece. By contrast 2005 shows an increase in visitors to 
Greece over 2004, which itself was not just any random year, but the one during which 
the Olympic Games in Athens took place; the considerable terrorist activity in the UK 
during 2005 does not appear to have discouraged visitors to Greece. 
The limited explanatory effect of terrorist activity on travel to Greece can be 
rationalised by the situational choice model used by Moss et al. (2007) which breaks 
tourists’ behaviour down into three coordinates, namely problem recognition, constraint 
recognition and level of involvement
15. Given that the overwhelming majority of tourists 
travelling to Greece come from Germany, the UK, France, the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries, the “problem” and “constraint recognition” dimension as well as 
that describing the “level of involvement” affect one source of tourist visitors at a time, 
namely the country where the terrorist attack took place, leaving all other countries of 
origin unaffected. This diversion of the detrimental effect of terrorism upon travel activity 
restricts the adverse repercussions of the former upon the latter and explains the low 
degree of responsiveness of tourist arrivals to Greece to terrorist casualties in Europe. 
 
                                                 
15 Taking as an example the 2005 terrorist attacks in the UK, the three effects are broken down as follows: 
The travelling public in the UK felt that the specific attack significantly increased the danger associated 
with travel in the specific country (problem recognition), that they had no control over the increased danger 
(constraint recognition), and the event was personally relevant (level of involvement). A prospective 
traveller to Greece from Scandinavia, however, is not expected to be affected by this reasoning. 
  185. Conclusions 
The services sector and especially its main items in the Greek current account 
namely travel and transportation receipts have always been considered as being 
notoriously volatile. It has thus been commonly thought that it may require just a minor 
exogenous disturbance to upset the flow of receipts from tourism thus threatening the 
financing of the trade deficit. This paper shows that, despite strong theoretical reasons for 
thinking that tourism might be affected by terrorism, empirically the impact of a major 
terrorist attack at a global level is found to be small. This is consistent with the situational 
choice model which leaves ample room for a wide selection of additional explanatory 
variables to determine the number of arrivals to Greece. Indeed the elasticities of arrivals 
with respect to income and both domestic and foreign price changes are much higher than 
the elasticity with respect to terrorist attacks. The parallel adverse repercussions resulting 
from the implications of a terrorist attack on the incomes of the sending countries do not 
seem to be enough to make matters worse. Finally, the possibility that providers of tourist 
services in Greece offer price decreases, to counterbalance the adverse effects of 
terrorism are rather remote given that in an environment of late bookings and all-
inclusive strategies, the margins for price reduction are rather limited. 
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